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This paper investigates empirically and attempts to identify the sources
of real exchange rate fluctuations since the collapse of Bretton Woods.
The paper's first two sections survey and extend earlier, non-structural
empirical work on this subject by Campbell and Clarida (1987), Meese and
Rogoff (1988), and Cumby and Huizinga (1990). The paper's main
contribution is to build and estimate a three equation open macro model in
the spirit of Dornbusch (1976) and Obstfeld (1985) and to identify the
model's structural shocks - to demand, supply, and money - using the
approach pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989). For two of the four
countries we study, Germany and Japan, our structural estimates imply that
monetary shocks, to money supply as well as to the demand for real money
balances, explain a substantial amount of the variance of real exchange
rates relative to the dollar. We find that demand shocks, to national
saving and investment, explain the majority of the variance in real
exchange rate fluctuations, while supply shocks explain very little. The
model's estimated short run dynamics are strikingly consistent with the
predictions of the simple textbook Mundell-Fleming model.
This paper was prepared for the Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public
Pol icy held at Carnegie-Mellon University in November 1993.
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Introduction
This paper investigates and attempts to identify the sources of real
exchange rate fluctuations since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s. In an influential paper,
Mussa (1986) argued that sluggish price adjustment must play a central
role in explaining the short run movements in real and nominal exchange
rates. He based this conclusion on the indisputable fact that the
volatility of real exchange rates since the collapse of Bretton Woods has
closely tracked the volatility of nominal exchange rates, and that the
variance of real exchange rates since the collapse of fixed exchange rates
has been 8 to 80 times higher than during Bretton Woods.
Stockman (1987) pointed out that, according to the equilibrium
approach to exchange rates developed in his and other papers, the behavior
of real exchange rates since the collapse of Bretton Woods could reflect
not the importance of sluggish price level adjustment, but rather the
influence of real shocks with large permanent components. The empirical
findings that, since the collapse of Bretton Woods, real exchange rates
appear to possess a unit root and that most of the variance of changes in
real exchange rates is attributed to permanent shocks (Huizinga (1987)),
and that little of the variance of real exchange rate changes can be
accounted for by real interest rate differentials (Campbell and Clarida
(1987); Meese and Rogoff (1988)) have, taken together, tended to cast
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doubt on the relevance of the basic "sticky price" open macro model
(Dornbusch (1976)) for explaining real exchange rates. Meese and Rogoff
(1988) conclude:
Our evidence provides no support whatsoever for the view that
a model [that emphasizes the interaction of sticky prices and
monetary disturbances] can explain the major swings in the
real exchange rate. The strongest prediction of those models
- that real interest differentials will be highly correlated
with real exchange rate movements - simply does not appear in
the data. (Meese and Rogoff (1988), p. 940)
Any model of the real exchange rate that incorporates monetary
neutrality in the long run implies that the level of the real exchange
rate, at least in the long run, is invariant to shocks in money supply and
the demand for real money balances. It follows that, if money is to have
an influence on real exchange rates, the influence must be felt in the
short run. Empirically, this means that an upper bound on the
contribution of monetary shocks to the variance of real exchange rate
changes is given by the variance of the change in the transitory component
in real exchange rates. This is an upper bound because real shocks to
national absorption, fiscal shocks, and supply, productivity shocks can
also have transitory effects on the real exchange rate.
In the next section of this paper, we revisit the real interest rate
- real exchange rate connection. We show how the approach introduced by
Campbell and Clarida (1987) and Meese and Rogoff (1988) and studied
recently by Baxter (1992) can be generalized to allow for a much wider
class of stochastic processes for the real interest differential than is
required by these previous papers. Notwithstanding this generalization,
we find, as did Campbell and Clarida (1987) and Meese and Rogoff (1988)
that the transitory component in dollar real exchange rates implied by the
time series on real interest differentials accounts for only a trivial
fraction of the variance in the log change in real exchange rates.
In the paper's third section we estimate the transitory component in
real exchange rates using a multivariate version of the Beveridge-Nelson
(1981) decomposition. In addition to lagged real exchange rate changes,
the VAR information set used to forecast future real exchange rate changes
includes lagged inflation differentials and lagged changes in US output
relative to foreign output. We include lagged inflation differentials in
the VAR because, as demonstrated by Cumby and Huizinga (1990), lagged
inflation helps to forecast subsequent changes in bilateral real exchange
rates. Lagged inflation differentials are also likely to be correlated
with nominal shocks in the US relative to the foreign country under study.
We include lagged log changes in the ratio of US to foreign output because
the evidence of a unit root in real exchange rates suggests that real
shocks - to supply as well as to demand for national outputs such as
fiscal shocks (Meltzer (1993)) - must play a role in understanding the
behavior of real exchange rates since 1973. While the Beveridge-Nelson
decompositions based upon these trivariate VARs are not structural, we
investigate and estimate later in the paper a structural open macro model
that employs these very VARs.
We find, as did Cumby and Huizinga (1990) who computed Beveridge -
Nelson decompositions using a smaller system that included only the lagged
inflation differentials, that there is a substantial transitory component
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in the dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange rates. In particular, we
show that the variance of the change in the BN transitory component is 70
percent of the variance of the change in the dollar-DM real exchange rate,
and 59 percent of the variance of the change in the dollar-yen real
exchange rate. We also show that lagged inflation differentials Granger
cause real exchange rate changes in these two countries. We contrast the
transitory component in real exchange rates recovered from a univariate BN
decomposition with the component recovered from our multivariate system.
In section four of the paper, we present a three equation open macro
model that can be used to interpret the trivariate VARs estimated in
section three of the paper. This model, which is a stochastic version of
the two country, rational expectations open macro model developed by
Obstfeld (1985), exhibits the standard Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch results
in the "short run" when prices adjust sluggishly to money, supply, and
demand shocks, but it also embodies the "longer run" properties that
characterize macroeconomic equilibrium in the open economy once prices
adjust fully to all shocks. Throughout this paper, we shall refer
interchangeably to "nominal" shocks and "monetary" shocks. Our
theoretical model, and our empirical strategy, allows for shocks to
relative national money supplies and relative national demands for real
money balances. The combined impact of these disturbances is identified
as a monetary, or nominal, shock by our approach. We employ the long run
properties of this model - properties that are shared with many other open
macro models including the cash-in-advance Arrow-Debreu models developed
by Lucas (1982) and others - to obtain restrictions that can be used to
identify three structural shocks that drive the system: shocks to "money",
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shocks to "demand", and shocks to "supply". Identification is achieved
using the approach pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989), employed by
Shapiro and Watson (1988), Gali (1992), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992),
and critiqued by Evans and Reichlin (1993). An important advantage of
the Blanchard-Quah approach to identification is that we do not have to
take a stand on the dynamics or the contemporaneous exclusion of any
structural shock from any particular equation. Rather, we use only the
longer run restrictions implied by our model - and many other open macro
models - to identify the structural dynamics from the data.
Section five presents the paper's key empirical results. For two of
the four countries we investigate, Japan and Germany, our structural VAR
estimates imply that nominal shocks explain a substantial amount of the
variance in dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange rates. In particular,
we find that more than 41 percent of the unconditional variance of the
change in the dollar-DM real exchange rate, and more than 35 percent of
the variance of the change in the dollar-yen real exchange rate are
attributed to nominal shocks. For the other two countries in our study,
Britain and Canada, there is much less evidence that nominal shocks are
important for real exchange rate fluctuations. We also devote extensive
efforts to determine whether or not the money, demand, and supply shocks
our empirical models recover "look like" such shocks are supposed to look.
We do this by decomposing the "real time" history of each real exchange
rate into the history of the implied monetary, demand, and supply
influences that, according to our estimates, generated the realized path
of the real exchange rate. We also generate impulse response functions to
the three structural shocks and compare those responses with those implied
by our version of the Mundell-Fleming-Obstfeld model presented in Section
four. One contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that in all four
countries, the short run dynamic responses of relative national outputs,
prices, and the real exchange rate to money and demand shocks are
consistent with the predictions of a stochastic, rational expectations
version of the textbook Mundell-Fleming model.
Section six of the paper compares our findings with those reported
recently in the literature and provides some concluding remarks.
Real Interest Rates and the Transitory Component in Real Exchange Rates
Over the past decade, a number of papers have exploited the
relationship between real interest differentials and real exchange rates
implied by interest parity to make inferences about the transitory
component embedded in real exchange rates (Frankel (1979;1985), Loopesko
and Shafer (1983), Sachs (1985), Campbell and Clarida (1987), Meese and
Rogoff (1988), Baxter (1992), and Edison and Pauls (1993)). Letting rrt
denote the short term ex ante real interest differential in favor of the
home country:
(1) rr\ -= ( i\ - £ ryVi) - dft " ^ f t + 1 ) ;
uncovered interest parity implies:
(2) rrt = £\Aqr + 1;
where qt = s. + pf,_ - p'\ is the log of the real exchange rate and Et is the
linear projection operator. Equation (2) can be solved forward to obtain:
• =co
(3) orr. = -f-;.S~rr\
 + 1;
where qrrt is the difference between the current level of qt, the real
exchange rate, and qt - 1 im,-^0Etqt+J, the expected long run level of the real
exchange rate;
Thus when qri\ is negative and the dollar is transitorily overvalued
relative to the uvel of long run real exchange rate, the magnitude of
this overvaluation is given by the sum of ex ante real interest
differentials in favor of the dollar. The expected sum of ex ante real
interest differentials is unobservable. However, letting
denote the ex post real interest rate differential and using the fact that
rrt = Etrl+l, we can use the law of iterated expectations to express qrrt in
terras of ex post real differentials:
(5) q"t = - E t2 Jr t + J.
J = I
Projecting both sides of (5) on an informationion set xt we obtain:
(6) E(q"\\xj - - E(Z rt+jjxt;.
The right hand side of (6) can be obtained by summing the forecasts
derived from an estimated VAR model for xt that includes the ex post real
interest rate differential. According to (6), the estimate each period of
the sum of real interest differentials derived in this fashion is, in
population, equal to the projection of the transitory component of the
real exchange rate qLI\ on the information set xt that would be obtained
under interest parity if qirL were in fact observable.
We estimate E(qirLJxt), the transitory divergence between the real
exchange rate and the expected long run real exchange rate implied by
interest parity, using a bivariate VAR in [Aqt, rt] to forecast each period
the sura of real interest differentials. We use non-overlapping data on 3
month ex post real interest differentials and the 3 month log difference
in the real exchange rate for Germany, Japan, Canada, and Britain over the
floating exchange rate period 1973:3-1992:1. Since the interest rate data
for Japan begin in 1975:3, our estimates of qrrL for Japan cover the period
1975:3 - 1992:1. Both real interest differentials and the change in the
real exchange rate are constructed using CPI indexes of national price
levels. Each VAR contain sa constant and 4 lags of Aq and r.
Charts 1 through 4 present the results of this exercise. The center
panel of each chart depicts the time path of -qrrt implied by the interest
parity relationship (6) and the estimated bivariate VAR. The top panel in
each chart presents, using a solid line, the actual time path of the level
of the real exchange rate qt and presents, using a broken line, the time
path of the estimated long run real exchange rate that is defined by (4)
and that can be recovered using the estimates of E(qrrt[xt).
Chart 1 presents the results for Germany. As can be seen from the
top panel of Chart 1, the floating rate years have been marked by three
period of substantial, sustained swings in the real value of the dollar
relative to the DM. In the first period, 1977 through 1979, the dollar
depreciated by 20 percent in real terms against the DM in tandem with an
acceleration in US inflation and a loss in confidence in US monetary
policy. In the second period, 1980 through 1984, the real value of the
dollar appreciated by more than 50 percent against the DM. This
appreciation occurred in conjunction with shift to a disinflationary US
monetary policy and change in the US fiscal stance that resulted in a
pronounced widening in the US budget deficit and a decline in national
saving. In the third period, 1985 through 1987, the dollar depreciated by
40 percent in real terras against the DM. {PLACE CHART 1 HERE)
The center panel of Chart 1 presents the estimates of -qrrt, the
transitory over or under valuation of the dollar relative to its long run
level implied by the time series properties of ex post real interest
differentials and interest rate parity. The estimates of -qrrt implied by-
real interest differentials suggests a modest degree of overshooting in
the dollar-DM real exchange rate in each of these three episodes. In
particular, throughout the 1977 - 1979 period in which the dollar
depreciated by 20 percent against the DM in real terms, expected future
real interest differentials implied a 2 to 3 percent under valuation of
the real dollar-DM exchange rate - and thus the expectation of a 2 to 3
percent appreciation of the dollar. Of course, that expectation was more
than realized between 1980 and 1984 as the real value of the dollar
appreciated by 50 percent or more against the DM. We note that
consistently throughout 1982, 1983, and 1984, the time series of expected
future real interest differentials implied that the dollar was overvalued
by 3 to 5 percent relative to the DM in real terms during this
appreciation and thus, that the dollar was expected ultimately to
depreciate and "give back" 3 to 5 percent of the huge real appreciation of
the early 1980s. Again, this expectation was more than realized between
1985 and 1987 when the real value of the dollar against the DM did in fact
depreciate, but by 40 percent. As during the 1977 - 1979 real
depreciation, expected future real interest differentials implied a 3 to
4 percent under valuation of the real dollar-DM exchange rate throughout
1986 and 1987, suggesting some modest amount of overshooting in the real
dollar-DM exchange rate in the years following the Plaza Accord.
Chart 2 presents the results for Japan. As with Germany, we observe
in retrospect three period of substantial , sustained swings in the real
value of the dollar relative to the yen: a two year period, 1977 through
1978, of sustained dollar depreciation, followed by a six year period,
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1979 through 1984, in which the real dollar-yen exchange rate appreciated
by 50 percent, followed by a three year interval in the which the exchange
rate depreciated by 50 percent against the yen in real terms. The
estimates of -qrS presented in the center panel of Chart 2 provide some
modest indication of overshooting in the 1977-1978 and 1985-1987 periods
of dollar-yen real depreciation, with the dollar estimated to be some 1 to
2 percent undervalued in 1977-1978 and 1985-1987. There is somewhat more
evidence of overshooting during the years 1981-1984 in which the dollar
was estimated to be 2 to 3 percent overvalued. {PLACE CHART 2 HERE}
Chart 3 presents the UK results. {PLACE CHART 3 HERE} Again, three
intervals of substantial. sustained swings in the real value of the dollar
relative to sterling are evident in the data. However, the estimates of
-qirL presented in the center panel of Chart 3 provide little indication
of overshooting in the 1977-1979 period of dollar-sterling real
depreciation or in the 1980-1984 period of dollar-sterling real
appreciation. However, the estimates do suggest that the dollar did
overshoot by some 3 to 4 percent in 1986 and 1987.
Chart 4 presents the results for Canada. {PLACE CHART 4 HERE} In
contrast with the other three countries the dollar actually appreciated
against the Canadian dollar in real terms during 1977-1979, and continued
this appreciation throughout most of period 1980-1985. Consistently, the
time series of forecasted real interest differentials indicates that the
dollar was overvalued during this appreciation and was expected to
depreciate in real terms by some 2 to 3 percent. Beginning in 1986, the
dollar did in fact begin a sustained real depreciation, overshooting the
long run real exchange rate by some 3 percent.
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The top panel of Table 1 reports the ratio of the sample variance of
AqrrL to the sample variance of Aqt for each of the four real exchange
rates relative to the dollar. These results confirm impression conveyed
by Charts 1 to 4: little of the variance of real exchange rate changes can
be accounted for by changes in the expected sum of future real interest
differentials. These findings generalize, but support, the conclusions of
Campbell and Clarida (1987) and Meese and Rogoff (1988) who assumed that
the expected sum of future real interest differentials is proportional to
the current ex ante real interest differential qrrt = £rrt. The center
panel of Table 1 reports Granger causality tests for the bivariate VARs
containing '+ lags of 'Aq,., L% j that are used to estimate qrrt, the
transitory component in each real exchange rate relative to the dollar.
As can be seen in the table, ex post real interest differentials are
forecastable. For all four countries, lagged ex post real interest
differentials help to forecast future real differentials and in two
countries, lagged changes in real exchange rates Granger cause real
interest differentials. By contrast, Table 1 shows that changes in real
exchange rates are substantially less forecastable conditional on this
information set containing lagged real exchange rate changes and lagged
real interest differentials. Moreover, in no country do lagged real
interest differentials Granger cause subsequent real exchange rate
changes. (PLACE TABLE 1 HERE}
According to interest parity Etrt+1 = EtAqt+1. Projecting both sides
on the VAR information set x\ = [Aqt,. . . , . Aqt_3, rt, . . , rt_3] we see that:
(7) E(rl.l\xt) - E(Aqt+l\xt).
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Thus, the interest parity hypothesis that is used to estimate qrrt implies
a set of cross-equations on the VAR, namely, that coefficients in each VAR
projection equation be identical. The results obtained from testing these
restrictions for each country are presented in the lower panel of Table 1.
As can be seen from the table, in three of the four cases, these
restrictions on the VAR forecasting equation can be soundly rejected at
the 2 percent significance level. These restrictions cannot be rejected
for the dollar-yen system, but this appears to be due to the fact that the
real dollar-yen exchange rate is unforecastable in this bivariate system
so that imposing the interest parity restrictions does not lead to a
substantial deterioration of the log likelihood. Of course, there are
scores of papers employing alternative, perhaps more powerful tests that
have investigated and rejected the uncovered interest parity hypothesis
(see Hodrick (1988) for a survey). The point we wish to make here is
simply that, the interest parity restrictions that are relevant for
estimating the transitory component in real exchange rates from
observations on real interest differentials are apparently also violated
in the data.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the divergence between E(qrrtjxt)
and E(Zj=1 mAqt+J [ x t), we plot in the bottom panel of Charts 1 - 4 the
latter series based upon the estimated bivariate VAR for each country. To
interpret these plots, we note that if interest parity held - or if we
imposed the interest parity cross-equation restrictions when forecasting
real exchange rate changes and real interest differentials from the VARs -
the line that plots -E(qrrtjxt) in the center panel and the line that plots
-E(S,
 = 1 o3Aqt+J [ xt) in the lower panel of each chart would coincide exactly.
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As is evident, this is far from the case. We conclude that, from the
perspective of recovering estimates of the transitory component in real
exchange rates, the departures from interest parity are substantial enough
to warrant the consideration of alternative approaches.
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Combining (8) and (9) we see that qBNt + qBNt = qt. Beveridge and Nelson
(1981) prove that qaNt is a random walk, while qBNt is stationary since qt
is 1(1).
Huizinga (1987) employed the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition to
investigate the importance of the permanent component in real exchange
rates relative to the dollar since the 1973 advent of floating. Using the
history of changes in the real exchange rate itself as his information set
to estimate the Beveridge-Nelson transitory component defined by equation
(8), Huizinga found evidence that, while fluctuations in the permanent
component of the real exchange rate account for most of the volatility of
observed changes in real exchange rates, actual real exchange rates
relative to the dollar did appear to overshoot persistently and revert
rather gradually to the to the long run equilibrium real exchange rate
defined by the Beveridge-Nelson permanent component.
Huizinga's (1987) univariate decomposition of the real
exchange rate followed the lead of Beveridge and Nelson in their original
work. Recently, several authors have uncovered some interesting
implications of multivariate generalizations of the Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition (Evans (1989), Cochrane (1990), and King, Plosser, Stock,
and Watson (1991), and Evans and Reichlin (1993)). One finding, due to
Evans and Reichlin (1993), is that, if the multivariate information set
includes variables that Granger cause subsequent changes in the real
exchange rate, the variance of the transitory component relative to the
Beveridge-Nelson permanent component derived from such a multivariate
system must strictly exceed the ratio of the transitory component to the
permanent component derived from a univariate information set.
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In this section, we present the results of trivariate Beveridge-
Nelson decompositions of the log real exchange rate of the dollar relative
to the yen, DM, sterling, and the Canadian dollar based upon VAR forecasts
of the change in the real exchange rate. The information set includes not
only lagged changes in the log real exchange rate, but also lagged
inflation differentials between the US and the foreign country, 7rt_j, and
lagged changes in the log ratio of US to foreign real GDP, Ayt_j. The data
are quarterly and span the floating exchange rate period 1973:3 - 1992I4,1
We include lagged inflation differentials in the information set because,
as demonstrated by Cumby and Huizinga (1990), lagged inflation helps to
forecast subsequent changes in bilateral real exchange rates. Cumby and
Huizinga (1990) studied a bivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of the
log real exchange in a system that included lagged inflation
differentials. The results of this section of our paper obviously build
on their work. We go beyond Cumby and Huizinga (1990) by including a
"real" as well as a "nominal" variable in the information set, by
explicitly comparing the multivariate with the corresponding univariate
decompositions, and by demonstrating the importance of Granger causality
in accounting for the differences between the decompositions. Lagged
inflation differentials are also likely to be correlated with nominal
shocks in the US relative to the foreign country under study. We include
lagged log changes in US to foreign output because the evidence of a unit
root in real exchange rates, in conjunction with the theoretical model we
derive below, suggests that real shocks - to the supply as well as to
demand for national outputs - must play a role in understanding the
behavior of real exchange rates since 1973 (Campbell and Clarida (1987);
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Stockman (1987)). While the Beveridge-Nelson decompositions based upon
these trivariate VARs are not structural, we investigate and estimate
later in the paper a structural open macro model that employs these very
VARs.
Charts 5 through 8 present the results of these decompositions. The
bottom panel in each chart depicts, using a solid line, the time path of -
qBNt which may be interpreted as magnitude of the over or under valuation
of the real dollar exchange rate relative to qBNt, the Beveridge-Nelson
permanent component. The bottom panel in each chart also depicts, using
a dashed line, the time path of -qBNUL, the over or under valuation of the
dollar real exchange rate obtained from a univariate Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition. The top panel in each chart presents, using a solid line,
the actual time path of the level of the real exchange rate qt and
presents, using a dashed line, the time path of the estimated long run
real exchange qBl\ derived from the trivariate system.
As can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 5, the estimates of qBNt
based upon the trivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition reveal sustained
periods of substantial overshooting in the dollar-DM real exchange rate.
In particular, throughout the 1978 - 1979 period of real dollar
depreciation against the DM, the dollar was undervalued by some 20 to 30
percent relative to the long run real exchange rate defined by qBNt. By
contrast, throughout the years 1983, 1984, and 1985 of "benign neglect"
during which the dollar surged, the real value of the dollar was
consistently overvalued by 10 to 14 percent, implying the expectation that
10 to 14 percent of the dollar's real appreciation during the early 1980s
would be given back through eventual real depreciation. {CHART 5 HERE}
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The contrast between the time series qB\ and qENUt for the dollar-DM
real exchange rate is striking for two reasons. First, the transitory
component in the real exchange rate implied by the multivariate
decomposition is substantially larger and more volatile than is transitory
component implied by the univariate decomposition, a fact evident from
Chart 5 that we shall quantify shortly. Second, q3Nfc is persistently of
the opposite sign to qaNUt. This means that, regardless of the differences
in magnitude, in periods such 1977 - 1979 when the dollar was depreciating
and in which the trivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition implies that
the dollar was undervalued and expected to appreciate in real terms, the
univariate decomposition implies that the dollar was overvalued and
expected to depreciate further. Moreover, in periods such 1982 - 1985
when the dollar was appreciating and in which the trivariate Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition implies that the dollar was overvalued and expected
to depreciate in real terms, q~N\ implies that the dollar was undervalued
and expected to appreciate further. Evans and Reichlin (1993) document a
similar difference between univariate and multivariate Beveridge-Nelson
decompositions of US real GDP. They demonstrate that cov( Aqt, qBNt) = -
2j
 = i Acov( Aqt, Aq,..,) . Thus the sign of the covariance between the change in
the real exchange rate and the level of the Beveridge-Nelson transitory
component depends upon the autocovariance of AqL. Evans and Reichlin
(1993) conclude that the contrast between the univariate and multivariate
estimates of the transitory component depends upon differences in
estimating the autocovariance using a univariate as opposed to a
multivariate information set.
{ PLACE CHART 6 HERE)
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Chart 6 presents the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition results for the
dollar-yen real exchange rate. Again, the estimates of qBNfc based upon the
trivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition reveal sustained periods of
substantial overshooting in the dollar-yen real exchange rate, both in
absolute terms and in comparison with the estimates for qBNUt. We note
that in 1976 and 1977, q£\ indicated that the dollar was substantially
overvalued relative to the yen and was expected ultimately to depreciate
by some 30 percent in real terms against the yen. A real depreciation of
this magnitude did in fact occur in 1978 and 1979. Indeed, the Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition indicated that the real value of the dollar
depreciated beyond its expected long run level sometime in early 1979, and
was thereafter undervalued throughout the rest of 1979, 1980 and 1981,
years in which the dollar actually did appreciate in real terms against
the yen. Overshooting is also evident during the later years, 1982 -
1985, of the dollar's Reagan-Volcker appreciation.
Charts / and 8 present the real exchange rate decomposition results
for the US-UK and the US-Canada. {PLACE CHARTS 7 AND 8 HERE} These
decompositions differ both qualitatively and quantitatively from those
just presented for the US and Germany and the US and Japan. As is evident
from Charts 7 and 8, and as will be confirmed shortly, relative to the
dollar, real sterling and Canadian dollar exchange rates appear to possess
rather small, and not particularly persistent, transitory components. In
other words, conditional on the trivariate information set studied in this
section, very little of the change in either the dollar-sterling or the
dollar-Canadian dollar real exchange rate is forecastable. Moreover, for
these two real exchange rates relative to the dollar, the behavior of the
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transitory components derived from the trivariate systems does not differ
substantially from the transitory component implied by the univariate
decompositions.
The top panel of Table 2 presents sample estimates of the ratio of
the variance of the change in the Beveridge-Nelson transitory component in
the real exchange rate to the variance of the actual change in the real
exchange rate. {PLACE TABLE 2 HERE} These results confirm the impressions
conveyed by Charts 5 - 8 . Based upon the Beveridge-Nelson decompositions
derived from the trivariate systems, the variance of the change in the
transitory component of the dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange rates
is estimated to account for a quite substantial fraction of the actual
change in these real exchange rates. Whether or not one views this as a
"substantial" transitory component depends of course on one's priors.
Until the mid 1980s, there was something of a consensus among researchers
that most movements in real exchange rates represented transitory
fluctuations around a slowly changing, if not constant, equilibrium real
exchange rate. Since the papers by Campbell and Clarida (1987), Huizinga
(1987), Stockman (1987), Meese and Rogoff (1988), and Grilli and Kaminski
(1991), the weight of the evidence suggests that most movements in real
exchange rates represent permanent shifts in real exchange rates.
However, Grilli and Kaminski (1991) point out that real exchange rate
"facts" can be quite regime specific, and that post-1973 empirical
regularities, including the importance of permanent shocks, may not
generalize to other floating exchange rate periods. By contrast,
transitory predictable changes in the real dollar-sterling and Canadian
dollar exchange rates appear, based upon the sample variances, to be much
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less important in accounting for changes in these real exchange rates.
The top panel of Table 2 also reinforces the point, evident in the Charts,
that the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of the real exchange rate into
permanent and transitory components depends upon the information set. For
the dollar-DM and the dollar-yen real exchange rates, the ratio of the
variance of the transitory component to the change in the real exchange
rate based upon the trivariate VAR is four times larger than is the ratio
based upon a univariate autoregressive model for real exchange rate
changes. For the dollar-sterling and especially the US-Canadian dollar
real exchange rates, there is much less differences between the variance
ratios calculated from the univariate and multivariate information sets.
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents some summary statistics for the
estimated trivariate VARs. For the dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange
rates , we see that lagged inflation differentials Granger cause subsequent
real exchange rate changes. Cumby and Huizinga (1990) document that lagged
inflation differentials help to forecast real exchange rate changes, but
they do not report on Granger causality. Evans and Lothian (1993) do
document Granger causality from lagged inflation, but not inflation
differentials, to real exchange rate changes. For the dollar-sterling and
Canadian dollar real exchange rates, there is no evidence that lagged
inflation differentials, or for that matter lagged output growth
differentials, have incremental predictive content for subsequent real
exchange rate changes. These findings are relevant for interpreting Chart
5 - 8 and the variance ratios reported in the top panel of Table 2. As
mentioned earlier, if the multivariate information set includes variables
that Granger cause subsequent changes in the real exchange rate, the
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variance of the Beveridge-Nelson transitory component relative to the
Beveridge-Nelson permanent component derived from such a multivariate
system must strictly exceed the ratio of the Beveridge-Nelson transitory
component to the permanent component derived from a univariate information
set. Thus, the finding of Granger causality for the dollar-DM and dollar-
yen systems, and the absence of Granger causality in the dollar-sterling
and Canadian dollar systems, can account for the differences in variance
ratios reported in Table 2.
A Stochastic Rational Expectations Open Macro Model
We now present a stochastic version of the two country, rational
expectations open macro model developed by Obstfeld (1985). The model
also draws on papers by Dornbusch (1976), Branson (1979), Flood (1981),
Mussa (1982), Buiter and Miller (1983), McCallum (1988), and Canzoneri and
Henderson (1991). The model not only exhibits the standard Mundell-
Fleming-Dornbusch results in the "short-run" when prices adjust sluggishly
to demand, money, and supply shocks, but it also embodies the "longer-run"
properties that characterize macroeconomic equilibrium in the open economy
once prices adjust fully to all shocks.z All variables except interest
rates are in logs and represent home relative to foreign levels. For
example, y = v :' - v l and it = i'\ - if\ .
IS Equation:
(10) ydt = d^  + n(sL - pj - o(it - Et(pt+1 - pt)) .
Price Setting Equation:
LM Equation:
(12) m\- - p. - y, - Ai t .
Interest Parity:
(13) ±t = Et(st+1 - sj .
Equation (10) is an open economy IS equation in which the demand for
home output relative to foreign output is increasing in the real exchange
rate and a relative demand shock dt and is decreasing in the real interest
differential in favor of the home country. We think of dt as capturing
shocks to home absorption relative to foreign absorption such as fiscal
shocks. Equation (11) is a version of the price setting equations that
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have been studied in open macro setting by Flood (1981), Mussa (1982), and
others. According to (11), the price level in period t is an average of
the market clearing price expected in t-1 to prevail in t,t-1pet, and the
price that would actually clear the output market in period t, pefc. When
5 = 1 , prices are fully flexible and output is supply determined. When Q
= 0, prices are fixed and predetermined 1 period in advance. Equation
(12) is a standard LM equation, while Equation (13) is a statement of
interest parity. In the sequel we shall let the variable mt capture the
influence of shocks to relative national money supplies as well as shocks
to relative national demands for real money balances.
Before we solve the model, we need first to specify the stochastic
processes that govern the relative supply of output yst, the relative
demand shock dt, and relative money mt. In general, we would expect output
supply, output demand, and money to be driven by both transitory as well
as permanent shocks. For ease in obtaining an explicit, uncluttered
solution to the stochastic sticky price equilibrium, we shall suppose that
both y\ and mt are simple random walks and thus that shocks to supply and
money are solely permanent. However, it will be useful to allow for both
a transitory as well as a permanent component in the relative demand shock
dt. In particular, we suppose that a fraction 7 of any shock to relative
demand in period t is expected to be reversed in t+1. Pulling these





To solve the model, we begin by deriving an expression for the real
exchange rate qet that would prevail in a "flexible price" rational
expectations equilibrium in which output is supply determined.
Substituting the laws of motion for yst and dt into (10) and solving for
qet, we obtain:
(15) q\ = (y\ - dt)/rj + (rj(r, + a)yla18t.
The "flexible price" real exchange rate depreciates in response to a
supply disturbance and appreciates in response to a demand disturbance.
We note that when y > 0, the expectation that the demand disturbance will
be partially reversed in the future sets up the expectation of real
depreciation and dampens the magnitude of the appreciation in the present.
We next derive an expression for the price level pet that would
prevail in the "flexible price" rational expectations equilibrium. From
(12) and the definition of the real exchange rate, the pet must satisfy
(1 + \)p\ = int - y\ + \(Etq\^ " <1\) + A£tpet+1. Using (14) and (15),
we obtain:
(16) paL = mt - Y\ + \(1 + X)~l(r] + o)~1y5t.
All three shocks influence the time path of the "flexible price" price
level. The "flexible price" relative price level rises in proportion to
the monetary shock, declines in proportion to the supply shock, and rises
in response to the temporary component in the demand shock. A solely
permanent relative demand shock pushes up the common world level of real
and nominal interest rates in the flexible price equilibrium. Thus,
given output supply and money, a permanent demand shock must drive up home
and foreign prices in proportion, leaving pet unchanged.
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Collecting these expressions, we see that the evolution over time of
the flexible price equilibrium can be represented by the following three
equations:
y\ = y\:
(17) q\ = (y\ - dt)/rj + (rj (rj + o))~1a18t;
p\ - nt - Y\ + \(1 + \)~l(rj + o)-l18t.
In this flexible price equilibrium, the levels of relative output, yet, the
real exchange rate, q'\, and relative national price levels, p\ are driven
by three shocks - to supply, z.. , demand 5,, and money, v\ . As can be seen
by inspection of (1/), the system is triangular in the flexible price
equilibrium. Only supply shocks influence the level of relative national
outputs in the flexible price equilibrium, while both supply and demand
shocks influence the level of the real exchange rate. Finally, all three
shocks - to money, supply, and demand - influence the ratio of home to
foreign price levels in the flexible price equilibrium.
With this characterization of the system's flexible price
equilibrium, we now solve for the actual open macro equilibrium in a world
of sluggish price adjustment. Substituting (16) into the price setting
rule (11), we see that pL, the ratio of home to foreign price levels,
evolves according to:
(18)
 Pt = p\ - (I - 9)(vt - zt + ay8t);
where a = \(1 + \)'L(rj + o) ~. In response to a positive money or demand
shock, the price LcveL rises but by less than does the flexible price pet.
In response to a positive supply shock the price level pt falls but by less
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than does the flexible price pet. The degree of "sluggishness" is indexed
by (1 - 9). When 9=1, prices are fully flexible, and the actual price
pt coincides with pet.
The expression for the real exchange rate qt under sluggish price
adjustment can be obtained by substituting (10) and (13) into (12) and
using (18) to represent the difference between actual and market clearing
price levels. We obtain:
(19) qt = q\ + U(l - 0)(vt - zt + crySJ;
where u = (1 + A) (A + o + rj) 1. We see that when price adjustment is
sluggish, shocks to money influence the real exchange rate, even though
monetary shocks have no influence on the flexible price real exchange
rate. This follows from the renowned Dornbusch (1976) overshooting result
which is a property of our model when price adjustment is sluggish. The
nominal exchange rate is given by sL = set + (1 - a - r?)(A + a + rj)'1x(l -
9)(\\ - zt + a-y8t). Overshooting in response to monetary shocks will occur
if ( 1 - a - TJ) > 0. Interestingly, this condition implies the nominal
exchange rate will undershoot relative to the flexible price equilibrium
in response to real supply and demand shocks. We note that sluggish
price adjustment implies that the real exchange rate undershoots relative
to the flexible price real exchange rate in response to real supply or
demand shocks.
Finally, we can use (19) and the IS equation to solve for the demand
determined level of output in the "short run" when price adjustment is
sluggish. We obtain:
(20) vt =• v\ + (rj + o)u(l - 6)(vt - zt + a-y6t).
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Sluggish price adjustment implies that not only supply, but also money and
demand shocks, influence yfc in the short run. A monetary shock boosts
output in the short run with sluggish price adjustment, while home
relative to foreign output rises in response to the temporary component in
the demand shock.
In the stochastic open macro equilibrium represented by equations
(18), (19), and (20), all three shocks - to money, supply, and demand -
influence contemporaneously the levels of all three of the system's
variables - output, the real exchange rate, and prices. However, because
output, the real exchange rate, and prices are expected to converge to
their flexible price equilibrium levels, the system is triangular in the
Long run. Indeed, with the simple price setting rule we employ, the
system is expected to converge to the flexible price equilibrium in a
single period. Only supply shocks are expected to influence the long run
level of relative output. Supply and demand shocks are expected to
influence the long run level of the real exchange rate. And finally, both
real supply shocks and nominal monetary shocks are expected to influence
the long run level of prices at home and abroad.3 While these restriction
are intuitive and are easily and explicitly derived in our model, they
should also hold in many other specifications of a stochastic open macro
equilibrium, including those that arise in the cash-in-advance Arrow-
Debreu open macro models pioneered by Lucas (1982). Drawing upon the
approach pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989), we will exploit these
quite plausible long run restrictions in an effort to identify the
influence of money, demand, and supply shocks on the behavior of real
exchange rates over the past twenty years.A
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The Empirical Strategy
Our theoretical model implies that yt, qt, and pt are nonstationary
in levels but stationary in first differences .
 5 Letting Axt = /"Ayt, Aqt,
7rt7 ' denote the 3 by 1 vector of the system's 3 variables and et = [zt,
<^t> vtJ ' denote the 3 by 1 vector of the system's 3 structural
disturbances, we think of the data on Ayt> Aqt, and nt as being generated
by the following structural moving average model:
(21) Axt = CQet + C^^ + C2et_2 + . . .
where Co is the 3 by 3 matrix that defines the contemporaneous structural
relationship among the system's 3 variables. As discussed earlier, if our
simple expository model actually generated the data, the structural moving
average model - and the estimated reduced form - would be a vector MA(1).
In general, we would expect and do find much richer dynamics in the data.
An important advantage of the Blanchard-Quah approach to identification is
that we do not have to take a stand on the dynamics. Rather, we use only
the longer run restrictions implied by our model - and many other open
macro models - to identify the structural CL matrices from the data.
When we estimate a VAR, we do not directly recover estimates of the
structural moving average model. Rather, we estimate:
(22) Axt = ut + R^.-L + R2ut_2 + . . .
where ut is a vector reduced form disturbances. We assume that there
exists a nonsingular matrix S such that ut = Set. Comparing (21) with (22)
we see that: c0 = S, C2 = R,S, C2 = R2S, i.e. C(L) = R(L)S. Thus:
(23) ut = Cnet.
In addition to recovering estimates of the parameters that define the
reduced form moving average representation (22), we also recover an
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estimate of the symmetric variance-covariance matrix of the of the reduced
form disturbances:
(24) 2 = £Uu',.
As is well known, the model (22) is underidentified: it is not possible to
obtain estimates of C, and thus et without addition restrictions. To see
this suppose, as is common in the literature, that the structural shocks
are mutually orthogonal and that each has unit variance (the latter
requirement is without loss of generality). Then, from (23) and (24), we
see that:
(25) c\c0' - ::.
This representts a system of 9 equations in only 6 unknowns, the 3
variances and 3 covariances that define 2. Thus, 3 additional
restrictions are needed to identify Co and to recover the times series of
structural shocks ct as well as the structural system dynamics defined by
C,, C2. . . .
Identification According to Blanchard-Quah
It will be recalled that our open macro model is triangular in the
long run. That is, only supply shocks zt are expected to influence
relative output levels in the long run, while both supply and demand
shocks d. are expected to influence the real exchange rate in the long run.
Shocks to money v. are expected to have no long run impact on either
relative output levels or the real exchange rate. Using the notation of
our structural moving average model these restrictions are easily
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represented. Letting C(l) = Co + C1 + C2 + . . . , the restriction that
neither money vt nor demand dt shocks influence relative output levels in
the long run requires that:
(26) C12(l) = C13(l) = 0.
Similarly, the the restriction that money shocks vt do not influence the
real exchange rate in the long run requires that:
(27) C23(l) = 0.
We will now show that these 3 additional "long run" restrictions,
restrictions that are implied by our model as well as many other open
macro models including simple real business cycle models, are sufficient
to identify the structural matrix Co, to recover the structural system
dynamics defined by C-,, C2, . . .as well as the time series of structural
shocks et = [zt, 5t, v, j' to supply, demand, and money.
Letting Ro = I , R: = C1C0"1, R2 = C2CQ"1, and so on, the reduced form
moving average (22) that is estimated can be written:
(28) Axt = R~ut + f;^ ,., + Rzut-2 -r . . .
We note that R(l) = Ro + Rx + R2 + . . . = C(1)CO"1. Form the matrix:
(29) R(1)XR(1)'.
This matrix can be computed from the estimates of 2 and R(l) obtained from
the reduced form (28). Using (25) to substitute for 2 and the definition
of R(l) we see that:
(30) R(l)XR(l)' = C(l)C(l)
Let H denote the lower triangular Choleski decomposition of R(1)SR(1)':
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(31) HH' =
Now, our long run restrictions imply that C(l) is also lower triangular.
Since H is the unique lower triangular decomposition of R(1)2R(1)', we
have :
(32) C(l) = H.
From the definition R(l) = C(1)CO"1, (23) implies:
(33) Co = R
Thus, the fact that the long run restrictions given by our model imply
that C(l) is lower triangular can be used to identify Go. In practice,
these restrictions are easy to impose: simply estimate the reduced form
model and calculate R(l), compute the unique lower triangular Choleski
matrix H where HH' = R(1)SR(1)', and set Co = R(1)"XH. Given an estimate
of Co, we can recover the structural system dynamics defined by C1; C2, .
. . as well as the time series of structural shocks et = [zt, <5t, vt] ' to
supply, demand, and money.
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Empirical Results
In this section we present the empirical results that are at the
heart of this paper. Using the structural VAR to recover the results and
using our stochastic version of the Obstfeld (1985) open macro model to
interpret the results, we seek to answer two questions: what are the
sources of real exchange rate fluctuations since the collapse of Bretton
Woods and, in particular, how important are nominal shocks? To answer
these questions, we look at three complementary ways to summarize the
results of a structural VAR: we calculate variance decompositions of the
real exchange rate, we compute "real time" historical decompositions of
the level of the real exchange rate, and we plot impulse responses of
output, the real exchange rate, and inflation to the structural supply,
demand, and nominal shocks to assess whether or not the shocks that our
procedure identifies as supply, demand, and nominal "look like" supply
demand and nominal shocks are supposed to look. That is, by investigating
the impulse responses, we are checking whether or not our application of
the Blanchard-Quah approach identifies structural shocks that "pass the
duck test".6
We begin by reporting the results of two variance decomposition
exercises for the log real exchange rate. (PLACE TABLE 3 HERE} In the
first, reported in Table 3, the conditional variance of the level of the
log real exchange rate qt+k at various horizons k is split into the
variance due to unforecastable structural monetary shocks vt+j,
unforecastable structural demand shocks, 5t+j, and unforecastable
structural supply shocks zt+J, j = l,...,k. As can be seen from the
results reported in Table 3, nominal shocks account for a substantial
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fraction of the conditional variance of the level of the real exchange
rate at short horizons in Germany and Japan. For example in Germany, more
than 50 percent of the variance in forecasting the level of the real
exchange rate at a horizon of 4 quarters is due to monetary shocks. More
precisely, more than 50 percent of the 4 quarter variance in forecasting
the log level of the real exchange rate is attributed to the shock in the
system that has no long run effect on relative national output levels or
the level of the real exchange rate. In Japan, more than one third,
nearly 35 percent, of the variance in forecasting the level of the dollar-
yen real exchange rate at a horizon of 4 quarters is due to monetary
shocks. According to our structural VAR, nominal shocks do not explain
much of the variance in forecasting the level of the real exchange rate in
Britain and Canada. For example in Britain, only 1.3 percent of the
variance in forecasting the level of the real exchange rate at a horizon
of 4 quarters is attributed to monetary shocks; in Canada, less than 1
percent of the 4 quarter forecast variance is due to nominal shocks. We
shall discuss how to interpret these rather striking differences between
the importance attributed to nominal shocks in Germany and Japan and the
meager role attributed to nominal shocks in Britain and Canada after
investigating other results yielded by our structural VARs.
For all four countries, of the remaining variance in forecasting the
log level of the real exchange rate that is not attributed to nominal
shocks, virtually ail is attributed to demand shocks, and virtually none
is attributed to supply shocks. For example in Germany, of the 49.6
percent of the variance in forecasting the level of the real exchange rate
at a horizon of 4 quarters that is not due to monetary shocks, 42.7
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percent is attributed to demand shocks and only 6.9 percent is attributed
to supply shocks. It will be recalled that we identify the demand shock
as that shock in the system that has no long run effect on relative
national output levels but that can have an effect on the real exchange
rate in the long run.
In forecasting the level of an 1(1) variable such as qt, the variance
of the forecast error goes to infinity with the forecast horizon so that
the share of this variance attributed to monetary shocks - which by
assumption can have no long run effects on the level of qt - must go to
zero with the forecast horizon. {PLACE TABLE 4 HERE) Table 4 decomposes
the conditional variance of the change in the log real exchange rate Aqt+k
at various horizons k into fraction of the variance due to unforecastable
structural monetary shocks vfiJ, demand shocks, 5t+j> and unforecastable
supply shocks zt+J, j = l,...,k. As the forecast horizon increases, these
conditional variance shares converge to the shares of the unconditional
variance of the change in each real exchange rate due to supply, demand,
and nominal shocks. As is evident from Table 4, this convergence is quite
rapid - within 12 to 16 quarters. We see that 41.1 percent of the
unconditional variance of the change in the dollar-DM real exchange rate
is attributed to monetary shocks, 48.5 percent is attributed to demand
shocks, and 10.4 percent is attributed to supply shocks. According to our
decomposition, 35.2 percent of the unconditional variance of the change
in the dollar-yen real exchange rate is attributed to monetary shocks,
61.2 percent is attributed to demand shocks, and 3.6 percent is attributed
to supply shocks.
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As was the case for the decompositions of the level of the dollar-
sterling and Canadian dollar real exchange rates reported in Table 3,
monetary shocks do not explain much of the unconditional variance of the
change in either of the real exchange rates. For example, only 2.8
percent of the unconditional variance of the change in the dollar-sterling
real exchange rate is attributed to monetary shocks, with the bulk of this
variance, 91.1 percent, being attributed to demand shocks. Only 2.5
percent of the unconditional variance of the change in the US -Canadian
dollar real exchange rate is attributed to monetary shocks.
We next present in Charts 9 - 1 2 historical "real time"
decompositions of the level of each real exchange rate. The purpose of
this exercise is to assess whether or not the supply, demand, and nominal
shocks that our identification scheme recovers can plausibly be held
responsible for the time path followed by dollar real exchange rates since
the collapse of Bretton Woods. In particular, we are interested in
assessing the extent to which our historical decompositions match up with
the Mundell-Fleming conventional wisdom about the dollar and policy mix
(Sachs (1985); Feldstein (1992)) during the 1970s and 1980s. For example,
it is one thing for our econometric strategy to identify monetary shocks
that account for 41 percent of the variance in the change in the dollar-DM
real exchange rate. However, these variance decompositions only make
sense - at least to us - if episodes of "tight money11 or "expansionary
demand" correspond to periods of real dollar appreciation, and period of
"loose money" or "contractionary demand" correspond to periods of real
dollar depreciation.
(PLACE CHART 9 HERE)
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Chart 9 presents the results for the dollar-DM real exchange rate.
This chart, and the next three, are constructed in the following way. In
each panel, the solid line - newslogq - depicts the difference between the
actual log level of the real exchange rate and the level that would have
been forecasted based upon the history of the system up through 1974:3.
Thus, newslogq in 1982:3 reflects the cumulative impact of the three
structural shocks between 1974:4 and 1982:3. Each panel of Chart 9
compares the actual path of the real exchange rate with the path that
would have prevailed if only one source of structural shocks had hit the
system. The top panel of Chart 9 compares the actual path of the dollar-
DM real exchange rate with the path that would have been followed
historically if only nominal shocks had hit the system, the center panel
of the chart compares the actual path of the dollar-DM real exchange rate
with the path that would have been followed historically if only demand
shocks had hit the system, and the lower panel of Chart 9 compares the
actual path of the dollar-DM real exchange rate with the path that would
have been followed historically if only supply shocks had hit the system.
We find these result most interesting. As can be seen in the top
panel of the chart, virtually all of the dollar's real depreciation
against the DM in the late 1970s is attributed to nominal shocks, while
most of the dollar's real appreciation against the DM in the first half of
the 1980s is attributed to demand shocks. Note, however, that a not
insubstantial real dollar appreciation against the DM during the early
1980s, one that would unwind the real depreciation of the late 1970s, is
attributed to nominal shocks. Of the dollar's post-Plaza real
depreciation against the DM, roughly half is attributed to nominal shocks,
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and half is attributed to demand shocks. Supply shocks are not attributed
a significant role in explaining the dollar-DM real exchange rate since
the collapse of Bretton Woods.
Chart 10 presents the results for the dollar-yen real exchange rate.
As is the case for the historical decomposition of the dollar-DM real
exchange rate, the dollar's real depreciation against the yen in the late
1970s is attributed to nominal shocks, while most of the dollar's real
appreciation against the DM in the first half of the 1980s is attributed
to demand shocks. Note however that between 1979 and 1982, a real dollar
appreciation against the yen that would be sufficient to unwind the real
depreciation of the late 19 70s, is attributed to nominal shocks. Supply
shocks in favor of Japan are also attributed about 10 percentage points of
the dollar's appreciation during the early 1980s. Of the dollar's post-
Plaza real depreciation against the yen, virtually all is attributed to
demand shocks. {PLACE CHART 10 HERE}
Charts 11 and 12 present the results for the dollar-sterling and
dollar-Canadian dollar real exchange rates. {PLACE CHARTS 10 AND 11 HERE}
Perhaps not surprisingly, in light of the variance decomposition results
presented in Tables 3 and 4, monetary shocks are attributed only a trivial
role in accounting for the history of the dollar - sterling and dollar-
Canadian dollar real exchange rates. For these currencies, the time path
of the real exchange rate is essentially the time path attributed to
demand shocks. To summarize, dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange rates
are driven primarily by both money and demand shocks that produce a quite
plausible history real exchanges, while dollar-sterling and Canadian
dollar real exchange rates are driven almost exclusively by a shock that
is identified to be a demand shock. For no real exchange rate, with the
possible exception of the dollar-yen rate, are supply shocks identified to
explain any substantial movement in real exchange rates.
We now investigate the impulse dynamics of the four estimated open
macro models in response to the three structural shocks. Our objective to
assess the extent to which shocks that our identification strategy
identifies as due to demand, supply, and money generate dynamic and long
run responses that are consistent with the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model
presented in section four. For example, according to that model, a demand
shock in favor of US output should result in a real appreciation of the
dollar, a rise in US prices, and a rise in US output if prices are sticky.
To the extent that the demand shock is permanent, the model predicts that
the real appreciation of the dollar will be permanent as well. A nominal
shock which increases the US money supply or reduces US money demand
relative to the foreign country should result in a nominal depreciation
of the dollar, a rise in US prices, and a rise in US output and a real
depreciation of the dollar if prices are sticky. To the extent that the
shock to money supply or money demand is permanent, the model predicts
that the nominal depreciation of the dollar will be permanent as well.
Finally, a supply shock that boosts US output relative foreign output is
predicted to result in a real depreciation of the dollar, a fall in US
prices, and a rise in US output. To the extent that the demand shock is
permanent, the model predicts that the real depreciation of the dollar
will be permanent as well.
(PLACE TABLE 5 HERE}
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Table 5 presents the impulse response results for the US-Germany
structural VAR. In response to a one standard deviation nominal shock,
the structural dynamics fit remarkably closely the predictions of the
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. There is an initial 3.8 percent real
depreciation of the dollar, a nearly 0.5 percent rise in US output
relative to German output, and a 0.3 percent rise in US inflation relative
to German inflation. Chart 13A depicts this dynamic response, and reveals
that the output and real exchnage rate effects of a nominal shock die out
after 16 to 20 quarters. {PLACE CHART 13A HERE} Chart 13b compares the
impulse response of the nominal dollar-DM exchange rate with the real
dollar-DM exchange rate. (PLACE CHART 13B HERE) We see that the nominal
dollar-DM exchange rate overshoots substantially: in the long run the
dollar depreciates by 1.7 percent against the DM, while initially the
nominal dollar-DM exchange rate depreciates by more than 4 percent. We
also note that the nominal dollar-DM exchange rate does not appreciate
monotonically but that, instead, the exchange rate depreciates for several
quarters following the nominal shock. Indeed the maximum depreciation is
not achieved until 4 quarters after the initial nominal shock. This
phenomenon has been recently uncovered using a completely different
empirical strategy by Eichenbaum and Evans (1993). We shall compare our
findings and approach with the Eichenbaum and Evans paper in section six.
Table 5 also presents the impulse response dynamics to a demand shock.
Again, the structural dynamics fit remarkably closely the predictions of
the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. There is an initial 4 percent real
appreciation of the dollar, a 0.36 percent rise in US output relative to
German output, and a 0.44 percent rise in US inflation relative to German
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inflation. In the long run, the demand shock causes the dollar to
appreciate by more than percent against the DM in real terms. The table
also presents the impulse responses to a one standard deviation supply-
shock. Although US prices fall initially in response to the supply shock,
the dollar appreciates in real terms, in contradiction to the open macro
model presented above. In the long run, the real dollar-DM exchange rate
is essentially unchanged, even though the supply shock is forecasted to
have a permanent effect on US relative to German output.
Table 6 present the results for the US-Japan structural VAR. {PLACE
TABLE 6 HERE) As can be seen from the table, the impulse responses to a
nominal shock match the predictions of the theoretical model presented
earlier. There is an initial 3.4 percent real depreciation of the dollar,
a 0.56 percent rise in US output relative to Japanese output, and a 0.33
percent rise in US inflation relative to Japanese inflation. (PLACE CHART
14A HERE) Chart 14A depicts this dynamic response, and reveals that the
output and real exchange rate effects of a nominal shock die out after 12
to 16 quarters. {PLACE CHART 14B HERE} As shown in Chart 14B, the dollar-
yen nominal exchange rate overshoots: in the long run nominal dollar-yen
exchnage rate depreciates by 1.2 percent, while initially the dollar
depreciates by more than 3.5 percent against the yen. As is the case for
the dollar-DM, the nominal dollar-yen exchange rate does not appreciate
raonotonically but, instead, depreciates for two quarters following the
nominal shock. Table 6 also presents the impulse responses to a one
standard deviation demand shock. There is an initial 4.4 percent real
appreciation of the dollar-yen exchange rate, a 0.36 percent rise in US
output relative to German output, and a nearly 0.43 percent rise in US
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inflation relative to German inflation. In the long run, the demand shock
causes the dollar to appreciate by 5.5 percent against the yen in real
terms. Finally, and in contrast to the US-German results, the
real dollar-yen exchange rate depreciates in response to a supply shock
that boosts US output relative Japanese output, just as predicted by the
theoretical presented above.
Tables 6 and 7 present the impulse response results for Britain and
Canada. (PLACE TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE} For the most part, the results for
these two countries are similar to those we have just discussed in detail
for Germany and Japan. Nominal shocks lead to short run real
depreciation, a rise in L'S output, and a jump in US inflation. Demand
shocks lead to short and long run real appreciation, a temporary rise in
US output, and a temporary jump in US inflation. In Canada, supply shocks
boost relative US output, lower temporarily US inflation, and lead to a
short and long run real depreciation of the dollar. In Britain, the
results are qualitatively close to those reported for Germany: a supply
shock that boosts US output relative to British is forecasted to result in
a real appreciation of the dollar-sterling exchange rate, in contradiction
to the theoretical model.
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Concluding Remarks
For two of the four countries we have investigated, Japan and
Germany, our structural VAR estimates imply that nominal shocks explain a
substantial amount of the variance in dollar-DM and dollar-yen real
exchange rates. In particular, we find that more than 41 percent of the
unconditional variance of the change in the dollar-DM real exchange rate,
and more than 35 percent of the variance of the change in the dollar-yen
real exchange rate are attributed to nominal shocks. Expressed in terms
of conditional forecasts, we find that 45 percent of the 4 -quarter ahead
forecast error variance of the log level of the dollar-DM real exchange
rate is attributed to nominal shocks, and that 34 percent of the 4 -
quarter forecast variance of the log dollar-yen real exchange rate is
attributed to nominal shocks.
For the other two countries we study, Canada and Britain, our
structural VAR estimates imply that nominal shocks explain very little of
the variance in real exchange rates. At one level, the reason for these
contrasting results is easy to understand. Given the information set
implied by our structural model, very little of the change in either the
dollar-sterling or the dollar-Canadian dollar real exchange rate is
forecastable, a fact documented with our non-structural Beveridge-Nelson
decompositions. It follows that our, or any, structural model that uses
this information set will be unable to attribute much to nominal shocks
which can only have a transitory effect on the real exchange rate. Perhaps
a different, or larger, information set would imply much greater
forecastablility in the dollar-sterling and the dollar-Canadian dollar
real exchange rates. However, it should be noted that achieving
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identification with a larger information set might very prove to be a
daunting task. We have not attempted this, and leave this as a topic for
future research.
Our findings for the dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange rates
are quite consistent with those reported recently in an insightful paper
by Eichenbaum and Evans (1992). Eichenbaum and Evans attempt to isolate
the innovations in monetary policy using VARs that include either federal
funds rate or the ratio of non-borrowed to total reserves. Their VARs
also include either a nominal or real exchange rate as well as US and
foreign output and prices. These authors find that from between 13
percent to 42 percent of the 12 - quarter ahead forecast error variance of
the log level of the dollar-DM real exchange rate is attributed to US
monetary policy innovations depending upon how they specify the system,
and they report that from between 13 to 23 percent of the 12 - quarter
ahead forecast error variance of the log dollar-yen real exchange rate is
attributed to US monetary policy innovations.7 As can be seen from our
Table 3, our structural VAR approach attributes 28 percent of the 12 -
quarter ahead forecast error variance of the log level of the dollar-DM
real exchange rate to nominal shocks, and it attributes 15 percent of the
12 - quarter ahead forecast error variance of the log dollar-yen real
exchange rate to nominal shocks. Thus, our estimates of the contribution
of nominal shocks to explaining the short run variance in forecasting the
log levels of the dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange rates are near
the respective midpoints of the estimates presented in Eichenbaum and
Evans (1992).°
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A recent paper by Lastrapes (1992) also uses the Blanchard-Quah
identification strategy to estimate the importance of nominal shocks in
explaining the behavior of real exchange rates. Unlike our paper,
Lastrapes does not claim to, and his approach cannot, identify an open
economy macro model with his structural VAR. He investigates bivariate
VARs containing changes in the log real exchange rate and changes in the
log nominal exchange rate. Thus, his system can only identify two shocks,
a "real" and a "nominal" shock. In particular, his system cannot
distinguish between supply and demand shocks. Lastrapes (1992)
acknowledges that if the world is subject to more than a single real
shock, his identification strategy is potentially compromised. Perhaps
for this reason, our estimates of the importance of nominal shocks for the
dollar-DM and dollar-yen real exchange rates substantially exceed those
reported in Lastrapes (1992). For example, whereas we find that 45
percent (34 percent) of the 4 - quarter ahead forecast error variance of
the log level of the dollar-DM (dollar-yen) real exchange rate is
attributed to nominal shocks. Lastrapes only attributes 27 percent (6
percent).
One contribution of this paper has been to demonstrate that the
short run dynamic responses of relative national outputs, prices, and the
real exchange rate to nominal, demand, and, at least for Japan and Canada,
supply shocks are consistent with the predictions of a stochastic,
rational expectations version of the textbook Mundell-Fleming model.
These findings, along with the variance and historical decompositions
reported above, and the complementary findings reported in Eichenbaum and
Evans (1992), suggest to us that sluggish price adjustment must be
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incorporated into any effort to explain short run fluctuations in real
exchange rates (Mussa (1986)). This being said we also note that,
according to our estimates, real shocks to supply and demand account for
more than 50 percent of the variance in forecasting real exchange rates -
except at short horizons for the dollar-DM real exchange rate. Campbell
and Clarida (198 7) and Stockman (1987) have emphasized "real" explanations
for real exchange rate volatility. Our findings do not suggest that these
efforts are misplaced. Obviously, real shocks must be present if we are to
believe the many papers that find evidence of a unit root in the real
exchange rate since the collapse of Bretton Woods.
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1. The exception is Japan, for which we investigate the slightly shorter
sample period 1975:3 - 1992:4. We do this for comparability with the
results presented above for the Japan [Aqt,rt] system for which our
Euromarket data only become available in 1975:3. Following Hansen and
Hodrick ((1983) pp. 120-121), we also investigated samples for Germany,
Canada, and Britain that "excluded the transitional early years of the
floating exchange rate era". As Hansen and Hodrick point out, it was not
until November 1975 that the G6 countries "produced an agreement which led
directly to the amendments to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF which
formally ratified the flexible exchange rate system." While none of the
results for Germany, Britain, or Canada reported in this paper are
sensitive to the choice of a starting date of 73:3 vs 75:3, some of the
results for Japan are. Data sources are as follows: CPI data are from the
IFS tape; the spot exchange rates and the Euromarket interest rates are
point sampled from a data base maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York: the real GDP data is from the OECD Main Economic Indicators.
2. For expository convenience, and to parallel the bulk of the literature
on "sticky price" open macro models cited above, we follow Obstfeld (1985)
and do not explicitly incorporate the accumulation of foreign assets
(debts) via current account surpluses (deficits) that may result from the
shocks we study. We also ignore a time varying risk premium. Later we
shall discuss the empirical implications of a risk premium for the
empirical strategy we pursue.
3. The two country Obstfeld (1985) model we study has the property that
the home relative to the foreign market clearing price level is invariant
to a permanent relative demand shock. This is not a general property of
an open-macro equilibrium so we do not use it for identification.
4. The stochastic version of Obstfeld's (1985) model that we use to
motivate our identification strategy ignores, as does the bulk of the
literature, a time varying risk premium. If the equilibrium risk premium
is a stationary stochastic process that is a function of the three
structural shocks - to supply, demand, and money - on which we focus,
identification goes through as in the case, discussed in the text, in
which the risk premium is assumed to be constant. However, the closed-
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The sample is 1974:3 - 1992:1 except Japan which is 1976:3 -
1992:1. R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. "Exclude"
reports the significance level for an F-test that a variable
can be excluded from an equation of the VAR. The cross-


























































0.00 0.66 0.63 0.40
0.06 0.18 0.09 0.91




0.00 0.89 0.26 0.23
0.00 0.84 0.33 0.66
0.02 0.54 0.50 0.09
Trivariate VAR includes a constant and four
lagged values of Aqt, the change in the log real
exchange rate, Ayt, the change in the log ratio of
US to ioreign real GDP, and nt, the difference
between US and foreign inflation. The sample is
19 74:3 - 1992:4 except for Japan which is
1976:3 - 1992:4.
TABLE 3






















































(0 .129)(0 .129) (0 .055)
0.042 0.954 0.003
(0 .138)(0 .139)(0 .039)
0.044 0.954 0.002








































Value in parentheses is empirical standard error computed from
Monte Carlo simulation. VAR specification as reported in
notes to Table 2.
TABLE 4


































































































Value in parentheses is empirical standard error computed from
Monte Carlo simulation. VAR specification as reported in
notes to Table 2.
TABLE 5
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